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The ultimate value of theories of the fundamental mechanisms comprising the asset price in finan-
cial systems will be reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although
the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidences from the
fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics to explain states observed in the real financial
markets, previous theories that attempt to fully explain the complexities of financial markets have
been inadequate. In this study, we propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based
model approach to study the origin of complex states in the financial markets, characterizing impor-
tant parameters with an investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market.
The investment strategy of chartist traders after market information arrives should reduce market
stability originating in the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders strate-
gically submit orders with a fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market. We construct a
continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by a fraction of chartists,
Pc. We show that mimicking real financial markets state, which emerges in real financial systems,
is given between approximately Pc = 0.40 and Pc = 0.85, but that mimicking the efficient market
hypothesis state can be generated in a range of less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that
the mimicking market collapse state created in a value greater than Pc = 0.85, in which a liquidity
shortage occurs, and the phase transition behavior is Pc = 0.85.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of asset pricing has a long history in the
financial markets based on its crucial role, and under-
standing its fundamental mechanism is related to the in-
vestor behavior. No theory in the fields of economics
and finance can explain all aspects of the price mecha-
nism because the financial markets, which are one of the
most complex systems, are characterized by various mar-
ket states such as normal and abnormal states. To fully
understand the price dynamics of risky assets, we must
know the nature of the diverse states of financial markets.
Two celebrated scholars in economics, Eugene F. Fama
and Robert J. Shiller, received the 2013 Nobel Prize in
Economic Sciences for their work that furthered the un-
derstanding of fundamental features of asset pricing in
the financial markets [1]. Eugene F. Fama proposed the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which is widely ac-
cepted as the foundational economic theory of asset pric-
ing models, including pricing of both underlying assets
and options related to such assets [2, 3]. EMH assumes
that all investors in the financial markets are rational and
posits that these investors cannot predict future market
prices using past financial market information. However,
Robert J. Shiller proposed ‘behavioral finance’, which in-
cludes irrational traders who can predict future market
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prices using past information in the price movement of
risky assets or by means of the psychological effects of
investors [4]. Behavioral finance has been further de-
veloped by many economists and is well established in
mainstream financial economics [5–11]. Employing both
EMH and behavioral finance, many market microstruc-
ture models have been developed [12–20]. In addition,
studies at the micro level that utilize high-frequency data
from the financial markets have contributed to develop-
ing asset pricing and market microstructure field [21–25].
Unfortunately, the essential assumption of EMH is totally
different from that of behavioral finance. In other words,
most research on asset pricing models can explain some
of the features of various aspects of the market by mak-
ing specific assumptions regarding major factors, such as
investors and the dynamics of risky assets. Thus, the dif-
ficult of fully understanding the asset price mechanism is
grounded in the fact that a variety of independent the-
ories contribute to complete asset pricing models, and
fully understanding asset pricing has been possible only
by means of integrated models that map both theories.
Recent advances in understanding the stylized facts of as-
set prices in financial markets using an agent-based model
(ABM) have shed light on factors (1) that prompt us to
wonder whether the heterogeneity of investors is more
important than representative agents in this context and
(2) how interactions among traders affect the fundamen-
tal features of asset prices. As an understanding of as-
set prices that considers that traders are heterogeneous,
ABM has recently emerged as an alternative approach
in asset pricing models. The properties of ABM can be
distinguished from other methodologies as follows: (i)
2ABM provides the linkage from the micro investor level
to the macro market level and (ii) ABM can generate ar-
tificial data that include different market scenarios and
heterogeneous agent assumptions. Therefore, an artifi-
cial stock market has been created with various scenar-
ios that include not only heterogeneous agent types from
zero intelligence models to multi-agent models but also
various trading mechanisms, from market-clearing sys-
tems to order-driven markets [26–40].
To illustrate an alternative asset pricing model reflect-
ing the various market states of real financial markets,
we develop an artificial double auction market (ADAM)
constructed with heterogeneous agents, including funda-
mentalists and chartists, with a double auction market
as its trading system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
the Model section, we describe the ADAM. The results
section describes and discusses the results of the data
generated by the model. The Discussion and Conclusions
summarizes the paper and proposes avenues for future re-
search.
II. MODEL
Traditional asset pricing models in the financial
system are typically characterized by one partial aspect
among diverse market states, but the dynamics of asset
prices in the real financial system have many aspects
that can be result from the heterogeneity of traders, the
interactions among them, and a complicated trading
mechanism (double auction market), which has led us to
engage in our study using the ADAM.
In the ADAM, it is assumed that one type of stock is
traded. We assume that all agents know other agents’
type, past price information during their investment
time horizon and the current fundamental value pft of the
asset, which we take to follow the geometric Brownian
motion defined by
ln(pft )− ln(pft−1) = ǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0, σǫ) (1)
where pft denotes the fundamental value at time t. The
increments of ln(pft ) follow a normal distribution that
yields a standard deviation equal to σǫ for the aggregate
of the increments over integer time steps.
Fig 1 describes the schema of the trading process in
the ADAM. At the first step of the trading process, an
individual agent determines her own type according to
switching rules among agent types. After the process
of determining an agent type, one agent randomly cho-
sen forecasts future price and determines her order. Fi-
nally, the agent submits the order, which is determined
as one type between the market order and the limit or-
der under the double auction mechanism. If an agent
submits a market order to buy(sell), this market order
is matched with a limit order to sell(buy) at the best
ask(bid) price level, and the market price is determined
by the best ask(bid) price. If an agent submits a limit
order to buy(sell), this order is stored in a bid(ask) limit
order book. This trading process can be divided into two
sub-processes: the determining agent type process and
the double auction market process. The details of these
sub-processes are described in the following two subsec-
tions.
A. The determining agent type process
In the ADAM, the trading process begins from deter-
mining the agent type. We consider two heterogeneous
agent types: the fundamentalist and the chartist. The
fundamentalist agent prefers fundamental analysis and
corresponds to a fundamental trader in the real finan-
cial market [41]. In the ADAM, fundamentalists obtains
fundamental value information as a result of a fundamen-
tal analysis. Generally, the fundamental value of stock
is typically calculated by the discounted sum of future
profits or the earnings of the company issuing the stock.
This fundamental value moves like a random walk and
is largely not affected by the trend of the market price.
In the ADAM, fundamental value is assumed to follow
a Brownian motion, as represented by Eq.1. Therefore,
fundamentalism both stabilizes the market and random-
izes market prices. Market states driven by fundamen-
talists will be similar to the efficient markets proposed
by Eugene F. Fama. Unlike fundamentalists, chartists
are sensitive to the trends or fashions of market prices.
Chartists are agents who prefer technical analyses using
past price trends and correspond to technical traders in
the real financial market [42]. As proposed by Robert
J. Shiller, a chartist is an irrational trader and specula-
tor who destabilizes a market. In the ADAM, a chartist
is a trend-follower using trends of past prices. Addi-
tionally, chartists are classified as two types: optimistic
and pessimistic. Optimistic(pessimistic) chartists fore-
cast that future prices will be larger(smaller) than the
current price.
In most of the previous artificial stock markets using
ABMs, both fundamentalists and chartist are mixed
in expectations of the spot price form and can be
stochastically determined using initial fixed parameters
[35, 38, 40]. These models have the advantage of gener-
ating the market state as varying combinations of agent
types. However, these models do not provide an adequate
description of the dynamical properties of the market mi-
crostructure according to a change in the agent’s type.
To understand the dynamics of the market microstruc-
ture according to a change in the agent’s type, we seg-
regate the fundamentalists and chartists in expectation
form, and we consider switching rules between them us-
ing transition probabilities as we modify the rules of opin-
ion dynamics from previous artificial stock market mod-
els [31, 32]. Transition probabilities include herding that
occurs in the interactions between agents and the profit
3terms of each agent type. More details of switching rules
are presented in the Appedix A.
B. Double auction market process
After all agents determine their own types, one agent
is randomly chosen to participate in trading at any time
t. The chosen agent i forms an expectation about the
spot price or the future price pˆi
t,t+τ i
, that will prevail
in the time interval (t, t + τ i), where τ i denotes the in-
vestment time horizon of agent i. The future prices of
fundamentalist, optimistic and pessimistic agents are as
follows:
pˆit,t+τ i(fundamentalist) = p
f
t (1 +N(0,
σǫ
γf
)) (2)
pˆit,t+τ i(optimistic) = pt + |N(0,
στ i
γc
)| (3)
pˆit,t+τ i(pessimistic) = pt − |N(0,
στ i
γc
)| (4)
σ2τ i =
τ i∑
k=1
(pt−k − p¯)2
√
τ i/τ i (5)
p¯ =
∑τ i
k=1 pt−1−k
τ i
(6)
where pft denotes the fundamental value at time t, γf ,
γc denotes the risk aversion coefficient of fundamentalists
and chartists, and τ i denotes the investment time horizon
of agent i. We assume that γf is larger than γc. Also,we
assume that τ i of fundamentalists is larger than that of
chartists. These assumptions reflect the characteristics
that chartists are more speculative than fundamentalists.
N(0,
σ
τi
γc
) is normal distribution with a mean of zero and
σ
τi
γc
, as the standard deviation. στ i denotes the standard
deviation of prices during [t − τ i, t). Chartists take the
standard deviation of future prices from the market data.
Optimistic(pessimistic) agents drive the market price to
up-trend(down-trend) with the standard deviation of the
market price. Fundamentalists take the standard devi-
ation of the future price with σǫ, which is the standard
deviation of the increments of fundamental values.
If the agent expects that the future price will be larger
(smaller) than current price, she decides to buy(sell) one
unit of the stock. However, if the agent expects that the
future price is the same as the current price, the agent
does not submit an order. We assume that the agent is
willing to buy (sell) at a price bit(a
i
t) that is lower(higher)
than his expected future price pˆi
t,t+τ i
. bit and a
i
t are as
follows:
bit = pˆ
i
t,t+τ i(1 − ki(x)) (7)
ait = pˆ
i
t,t+τ i(1 + k
i(x)) (8)
Prob(ki(x)) = exp (−x/σ)/σ (9)
E[ki(x)] = σ , V ar[ki(x)] = σ (10)
where ki is distributed by an exponential distribution.
According to the double auction mechanism, the agent
selects a limit order or market order. If bit(a
i
t) is smaller
(larger) than the best ask aqt (the best bid b
q
t ), the agent
submits a limit order at the price level bit(a
i
t). The best
ask aqt (the best bid b
q
t ) means that the lowest ask(the
highest bid) is listed in a limit order book at time t. A
limit order is an order to buy or sell a stock at a specific
price or better and is stored in an order book that waits
for market orders. However, if bit(a
i
t) is larger (smaller)
than or equal to aqt (b
q
t ), the agent submits a market
order at aqt (b
q
t ). A market order is an order to buy or
sell a stock at the best available price in a limit order
book. When a market order is submitted in the market,
a transaction occurs. Until t + τ i, limit orders that are
unmatched with a market order are removed from the
order book.
At any time, t the price pt is given by the price at which
a transaction, if any, occurs. If no new transaction
occur, a proxy for the price is given by the average of aqt
and bqt so that pt = (a
q
t + b
q
t )/2, which is a value that
we call the mid-point. If no bid or ask price is listed
in the order book, a proxy for the price is given by the
previously traded or quoted price. All prices of orders
must be positive, and investors can submit limit orders
at any price on a prespecified grid, as defined by the tick
size ∆.
All agents trade under a budget constraint, and short
sales are forbidden. To prevent an overly large change
in market price, a submission of an order that exceeded
or was below 15 % of the closed price at a previous time
is forbidden. We assume that the volume of submitted
orders is always one unit, and one simulation step,
denoted by ∆t is 0.01 time. We assume one trading
period is 100 simulation steps (=100∆t = 1 time).
After trading is completed, all limit orders and market
microstructure trajectories are written in artificial data.
By analyzing of these artificial data, we can trace all the
processes of price formation at a micro-level.
III. RESULTS
We employ the ADAM model developed above to
understand the asset pricing model on a market mi-
crostructure level. According to the numerous results
from previous works, the asset price dynamics in
microstructure scope are characterized by several quan-
tities, including the return, volatility, bid-ask spread,
and first gap data sets [43–54]. Here, we simulate
the artificial data sets using the ADAM model, which
can generate significant information for understanding
asset price mechanisms, particularly in terms of the
heterogeneity of traders. We now proceed with the
simulation and analyze the data model generated. A
total of 100 simulations are performed with a different
random seed. Each simulation is performed with 500
4agents in 1,000,000 simulation steps(=10,000 times).
The values of the parameters used for simulations are as
follows:
σǫ = 0.005, σ = 0.1, ∆ = 0.0005, p(t = 0) = 300,
pf (t = 0) = 300,γf = 1.0, γc = 0.1, and τ
i = 3 [time]
for fundamentalists; and τ i = 1 [time] for chartists.
To protect market distortion in the ADAM model, we
construct the marker collapse state to recover to other
states by virtue of the rule which forbids trading in
excess or below of 15% of the market price in previous
trading periods.
Fig. 2(a) depicts a large fluctuation over time, which
indicates that an intermittent increase in the number
of chartists tends to deviate from that of the efficient
market, which consists only of fundamentalists. De-
viation from this behavior, however, is an efficient
market hypothesis. Fig. 2(b) - (d) shows the temporal
movement for the return time series, volatility, the
bid-ask spread, and the first gap, respectively. The
bid-ask spread is calculated by the difference between
the best ask and the best bid price, and the first gap also
corresponds to the difference between the best bid(ask)
and the next best bid(ask). In Fig. 2 (b)-(d), we find
that the temporal movement of the four variables should
be caused by the ratio of chartists in the market, which
is a finding supported previously by both theoritical and
ABMs [27, 28, 35]. Based on the results from Fig. 2,
the degree of information asymmetry induced from the
chartist traders plays an important role in the transition
behavior among diverse market states. In the Appendix
B, we also calculate the statistical and dynamical prop-
erties for four variables using the detrended fluctuation
analysis and the probability density function; similar to
the results from previous work [49–57], we find that the
long-range correlation observed in all data sets, except
for the return time series and the distribution function,
follows a power-law distribution function regardless of
data sets. We verify the usefulness of the proposed
model by analyzing the time series properties of the
artificial data sets generated by the ADAM.
Considering the significant role that the heterogeneous
investors in the financial market play in creating the
complicated market structure against the EMH market
with respect to homogeneous traders, it is natural to
expect that the degree of heterogeneity for traders
is essential to generate diversity in financial makret
conditions. To investigate the validity of this hypothesis
in terms of understanding the fundamental feature of
asset prices in the diverse market states, we analyze
whether the various market states, such as normal,
abnormal, and collapsed are determined by the ratio of
chartists as the source of abnormal market condition.
To analyze the relationship between the heterogeneity
of traders and market states, we divide the market
microstructure data of the ADAM model into a sub-data
set based on the ratio of chartist traders, Pc. As Fig.
3(a),(c),(e) shows, for three quantities volatility, bid-ask
spread, and first gap the ratio of chartist traders, Pc,
is an important factor that describes diverse market
states. In Fig. 3 (a),(c),(e), we depict the probability
of extreme events, Ne and the volume of limit order
books (LOB), as a function of the Pc , of those data
sets. Ne is measured by the event exceeded by four
standard deviations, 4σ. In all cases, Ne and the volume
of LOB is significantly related to Pc, which indicates
that in three quantities, Pc plays an important role in
terms of determining market states. In Fig. 3(a),(c),(e),
we find that, regardless of data set, three distinct
market states are observed and define each market
state as mimicking efficient market hypothesis(MEMH,
0 ≤ P volatilityc ≤ 0.45, 0 ≤ P bid-ask spreadc ≤ 0.44,
and 0 ≤ P first-gapc ≤ 0.4), mimicking real financial
market(MRFM, 0.46 ≤ P volatilityc ≤ 0.84, 0.45 ≤
P bid-ask spreadc ≤ 0.84, and 0.41 ≤ P first-gapc ≤ 0.84), and
mimicking market collapse(MMC, Pc ≥ 0.85) states.
MRFM states are defined by a threshold value larger
than Ne = 0.005. These results show that the MEMH
state is similar to the efficient market proposed by
Fama [2]. In an MEMH state, fundamentalists are
more prevalent than chartists in the market. With a
substantial number of fundamentalists, the market price
converges to a fundamemental value and reflects full
rationality. The volume of LOB increases because of
the vastly limit orders submitted by fundamentalists
in the MEMH state, indicating that fundamentalists
can play a role in the liquidity provider. An MEMH
state in the specific range of Pc implies that the efficient
market is only an ideal state or one type of states(out
of a variety of possible states) in the financial market.
In an MEMH state, the limit order volume decreases
with increases of Pc (Fig. 3(a)(c)(e)), which implies
that most market order submissions or transactions are
perfomred by chartists. For an MEMH state in which
the fundamentalists are more dominant than chartists
in the market, the probability density function (PDF) of
those variables follows a Gaussian distribution function,
which is similar to the EMH proposed by Eugene F.
Fama [2] and indicates that the market price converges
to a fundamental value that should be generated by
fully rational agents based on complete information.
The essential features of market prices generated only
by fundamentalists is similar to that of EMH (Appendix
C). For an MRFM state, there is a positive correlation
between the Ne of three variables and the Pc value, and
the PDF in Fig.3(b)(d)(f) follows a power-law distribu-
tion that is observed in a real financial market, which
reveals that the increasing number of chartists generates
extreme events that are frequently shown in the real
financial market. This finding indicates that the prices
in an MRFM state have trends or fashions and deviate
from efficient market states, as proposed by Robert
J. Shiller [4]. In other words, because there are more
chartists than fundamentalists in the market, the market
price becomes largely separated from fundamental value
(random walk). We also find that the volume of limit
order book (LOB) and Pc shows a negative relationship
5in Fig. 3(a),(c),(e). In an MMC state, we find that
Ne drops to zero due to the shortage of transactions,
and the volume of LOB is almost zero. According to
these results, the chartists should behave as liquidity
takers and can sharply increase the liquidity risk. An
MMC state created by chartists will ultimately lead to
a market collapse because of the liquidity shortage.
To analyze the characteristics of limit order book for
three distinct market states, we show snapshots of
the LOB of each state. Fig. 4 (a),(b),(c) shows the
LOB of the MEMH(Pc = 0.08), MRFM(Pc = 0.62),
and MMC(Pc = 0.85) states, respectively. In Fig. 4
(a),(b),(c), we find that the bid-ask spread and width
between limit orders increase as Pc increases; thus, it
is the smallest in the MEMH state and has the largest
value in the MMC state that is characterized by a
liquidity shortage or liquidity evaporation. In Fig. 4(b),
we find that the suitable ratio of chartists increases
the liquidity of transactions among agents and that it
will reduce the liquidity risk. Thus, the stability of the
financial market should be controlled by the ratio of
chartists in the entire population of traders. Previous
empirical studies have reported that the bid-ask spread
in a financial crisis is larger than it is before the crisis
[46, 47]. It is reported that specialists in the NYSE
(New York Stock Exchange) had trouble executing
trades because of the dramatic shortage of limit orders
on Black Monday on Octtober 19,1987 [48]. Our model
is consistent with these empirical findings, including the
liquidity shortage on Black Monday.
The standard deviation of volatility, the bid-ask spread
and the first gap as a function of Pc increase and
have peak points at approximately 0.85 (Fig. 5). All
maximum standard deviation values of these quantities
are normalized by 1. When Pc is greater than 0.85, the
standard deviation of the three quantities dramatically
decreases and is close to zero in Fig. 5. Our results
suggest that the behavior of LOB seems like a transition
from an alive state to a collapsed state at around
Pc = 0.85, which is similar to the phase transition
behavior described by previous research [58].
We observe various stylized facts in asset returns and
market microstructures such as power-law tails, a long
memory of volatility, first gap and aggregational Gaus-
sianity [49–57]. To confirm the effect of the chartists,
we performe an analysis of a homogeneous equilibrium
market that consistes of only fundamentalists. As a
result, market prices converge to the fundamental value,
and the market state does not deviate from the MEMH
state during simulation. MRFM, MMC and stylized
facts are not observed in the homogeneous equilibrium
market. The details of analyzing stylized facts and the
results of the homogeneous equilibrium market are can
be found in the Appedix B, C.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Understanding asset pricing is a crucial issue in the
financial market; however, because there is no adequate
theory in finance to explain it that includes all aspects
of the price mechanism, most theory reflects the partial
features of the manner in which asset prices are deter-
mined by the investment strategies of agents.
Indeed, applying important elements, including the
heterogeneity of traders and the double auction market
as trading system, to an artificial market should consider
a diversity of market states. In this study, we have
suggested the ADAM model to illustrate the diversity
of the financial markets from an efficient market to
behavioral finance. The ADAM model consist of a
heterogeneity of traders, including fundamentalists
and chartists, and provides a differentiated framework
compared with previous ABMs. Our key finding is
that the diversity of the financial market, including the
MEMH, MRFM, and MMC, is determined primarily by
the ratio of chartists, Pc, among all the traders in the
market.
The ADAM framework developed herein offers expla-
nations and raises questions that can further deepen
our understanding of asset pricing models in financial
markets. For example, although the ADAM cannot be
considered a multi-asset pricing model, the framework
we develop can explain the diversity of financial market
states and can provide a framework with which to
address the role of the heterogeneity of agents.
In summary, our findings argue that many aspects
of market states can be explored numerically by the
ABM if we combine the heterogeneity of traders and
the double auction market as trading systems, thus
opening a new route to a more in-depth understanding
of financial markets.
Appendix A: The switching rules of agents’ opinions
In this paper, we apply the modified transition rules
of agents’ opinions which are based on Lux and March-
esi(1999) [31]. The transition probabilities introduced in
Lux and Marchesi(1999) [31] denoted by πA,B∆t. πA,B
is the transition rate from type B to type A.
6π+− = v1
nc
N
exp (U1), π−+ = v1
nc
N
exp (−U1),
U1 = α1x+
α2
v1
dp/dt
p
π+f = v2
n+
N
exp(U2,1), πf+ = v2
nf
N
exp(−U2,1)
π−f = v2
n−
N
exp(U2,2), πf− = v2
nf
N
exp(−U2,2)
U2,1 = α3{r + (1/v2)(dp/dt)
p
−R
︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit of optimistic
− s|pf − p
p
|
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamentalists’ profit
}
U2,2 = α3{R− r + (1/v2)(dp/dt)
p︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit of pessimistic
− s|pf − p
p
|
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamentalists’ profit
}
where x = (n+ − n−)/nc,N,nc, n+, n−, nf denote
the number of agents, chartists, optimistic agents,
pessimistic agents, and fundamentalists.p denotes the
current market price, and pf is the current fundamental
value. The subscript +,−, f denotes the agent type,
e.g., optimist, pessimist, or fundamentalist. The mech-
anism that can change the agent types in transition
probability consists of a herding and profit strategy.
If the fraction of optimisticagents (n+/N) which is
related to herding strategy increases in the market, the
transition probabilities from other types to optimistic
agents(π+−, π+f ) increase. In addition, if the profit of
opimistic agents increases, the transition probabilities
from other types to optimistic agents increases. The
other types such as pessimists and fundamentalists also
have similar behaviors.
To avoid absorbing state(nc = 0 or nf = 0) in simulation,
we apply a rule that an agent with an opinion in a
population less than 0.8% in the total population can
not change her own opinion into other opinions.
We assume that the investment time horizon of each
agent type is different. Chartists have shorter investment
time horizon than fundamentalists. However, in the
transition probabilities in Lux and Marchesi(1999) [31],
the heterogeneous investment time horizon of an agent is
not considered. In other words, dp/dt is calculated dur-
ing homogeneous investment time horizons. However, in
the real financial market, investors have heterogeneous
information sets. Each investor cannot help but have
a different strategies due to the differences between
information sets that agents have. With the notion
of heterogeneous information sets between agents, we
modify this term dp/dt, which can reflect the investment
time horizon of heterogeneous agent types. dp/dt is
calculated by the average value of ∆p/∆t during agents’
own investment time horizon [t− τ i,t).
The values of the parameters are set as follows: N
(number of agents) = 500, v1 = 2, v2 = 0.6, α1 = 0.6,
α2 = 1.5, α3 = 1, r = Rpf (R = 0.0004), s = 0.75, ∆t
= 0.01 [time] ,τ i = 3 [time] investment time horizon for
fundamentalists, τ i = 1 [time] for chartists.
For more details about other parameters in transition
probabilities, see Lux and Marchesi(1999) [31].
Appendix B: Stylized facts in Artificial Double
Auction Market
We analyze ADAM-generated data and observe
various ‘stylized facts’ that were observed in previous
empirical studies [49–57]. Fat-tails of market microstruc-
ture quantities such as absolute return, bid-ask spread
and first gap, which were widely observed in previous
empirical studies, are observed in the ADAM(Fig.
6). We fit tails of the CDF (Cumulative Distribution
Function) of market microstructure quantities using
a power-law function, y ∼ x−α and α is estimated
by maximum likelihood estimation [59]. The fitted
results are summarized in Table I. Additionally, the
distribution of return as time lag increases converges
to the return distribution of fundamental value, which
follows a normal distribution(Fig. 7(a)), which is
called ‘Aggregational Gaussianity’, which is one type of
‘stylized fact’ in the financial markets [57].
To investigate the temporal correlation property of
market microstructure, we use the DFA (Detrended
Fluctuation Analysis) method introduced in Hu et al
(2001) [60]. The steps of the DFA are as follows:
(i) We consider time series x(i) (i = 1, ..., Nmax) noise
induced. We integrate the time series x(i), and which is
divided into boxes of equal size n.
y(j) =
j∑
i=1
[x(i)− < x >] (B1)
where
< x >=
1
Nmax
Nmax∑
j=1
xi (B2)
(ii) In each box, the integrated time series y(i) is fitted
by a polynomial function, yfit(i), which is called a local
trend. For order-l DFA(DFA-1 if l=1, DFA-2 if l=2,
etc.), we could apply the l-order polynomial function for
the fitting. Time series y(i) is detrended by subtracting
the local trend yfit(i) in each box, and we calculate the
detrended fluctuation Y (i).
Y (i) = y(i)− yfit(i) (B3)
For a given box size n, the root mean square(rms)
fluctuation function F (n) is calculated as
F (n) =
√√√√ 1
N
Nmax∑
i=1
[Y (i)]
2
(B4)
7(iii) We repeat the above computation for box sizes n to
find a relationship between F (n) and n, F (n) ∼ nH .
This power-law relationship indicates the presence of
scaling between F (n) and the box size n. The parameter
H is called the Hurst exponent or the scaling exponent
and represents the correlation property of the signal: If
H = 0.5,the signal has no correlation (white noise); if
H < 0.5, the signal has a mean-reverting property or
a short memory; if H > 0.5, the signal has a persistent
property or a long memory. In this paper, DFA-1 is used.
As a result, long memory is observed in volatility, the bid-
ask spread, the volume and the first gap in the ADAM.
In the return case, no memory is observed. These mem-
ory properties of the ADAM support previous previous
empirical works [49, 51, 55, 61]. Fig. 8(a),(b) depicts the
rms fluctuation functions F (n) of these quantities. The
results of the ADAM and previous empirical results are
summarized in Table II.
Appendix C: The case of the homogeneous
equilibrium market
To distinguish the effect of chartists in the mar-
ket, we investigate the homogeneous equilibrium market,
which consists only of fundamentalists (i.e. there are no
chartists in the market.) As Fig. 9shows, there is no
volatility clustering or a significant peak of the bid-ask
spread or the first gap. These results imply that there
is only an MEMH state in the homogeneous equilibrium
market. There are no fat-tails in the CDF of absolute
return, the bid-ask spread and the first gap (Fig. 7 (b),
Fig. 10). We measure the Hurst exponent using DFA-1.
Fig. 8 (c) and (d) depict the rms fluctuation F (n) of the
given market microstructure time series. The Hurst ex-
ponents of these quantities are similar to 0.5 (Table III),
which indicates that there is no memory property in the
homogeneous equilibrium market.
In short, when all agents are fundamentalists, abnormal
market behavior, such as financial crisis does not occur.
In additional, ‘stylized facts’ in the real financial market,
such as long memory, fat-tails and Aggregational Gaus-
sianity are not observed.
These results imply that chartists are the source of ab-
normal behavior in the ADAM.
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9FIG. 1. The schema of the trading process incorporated in the ADAM.
ADAM Empirical Result
return(positive tails) 1.89 ± 0.03 2.19 [51]
return(negative tails) 2.03 ± 0.04 2.17 [51]
bid-ask spread 1.53 ± 0.01 3.0 [49]
first gap 1.78 ± 0.02 1.5 - 3.0 [50]
TABLE I. The fitted results of the power-law function, y ∼ x−α. α is the power-law exponent. The elements of column
ADAM(empirical result) show the results of the ADAM(empirical works).
ADAM Empirical Result Memory Type
return 0.46 ± 0.01 0.5 [61] No(No)
volatility 0.82 ± 0.01 0.67 [55] Long(Long)
bid-ask spread 0.87 ± 0.01 0.73 ± 0.01[49] Long(Long)
first gap 0.87 ± 0.01 0.76[51] Long(Long)
FV return 0.49 ± 0.01 No
volume 0.94 ± 0.01 0.64 - 0.7 [56] Long(Long)
TABLE II. The Hurst exponent results of the ADAM and the comparison to empirical works. The elements of column
ADAM(empirical result) show the results of the ADAM(empirical works). The words in parenthesis at Memory Type indicate
the memory type observed in empirical works.[FV : fundamental value]
ADAM Memory Type
return 0.52 ± 0.01 No
volatility 0.51 ± 0.01 No
bid-ask spread 0.52 ± 0.01 No
first gap 0.50 ± 0.01 No
FV return 0.50 ± 0.01 No
volume 0.51 ± 0.01 No
TABLE III. Hurst exponents in the homogeneous equilibrium market of the ADAM. There is no memory in market microstruc-
tures in this case.[FV : fundamental value]
10
time0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
a
g
e
n
t
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
chartist
fundamentalist
time0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
re
tu
rn
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
time0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
v
o
la
til
ity
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
time0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
b
id
-a
sk
 s
p
re
a
d
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
time0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
fir
st
 g
a
p
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
FIG. 2. From the top to bottom in figures, the dynamics of the type of agent in the makret, return, the volatility, the bid-ask
spread and the first gap as a function of time. In the top figure, the solid red line represents the number of chartists, and the
dashed blue line represents the number of fundamentalists in the market.
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FIG. 3. (a)(c)(e) There are Ne and LV(limit order book volume) as a function of Pc. Ne denotes the number of extreme
events normalized by the number of total events. We define a financial crisis event whose value is larger than 4 σ. σ is the
standard deviation of the given time series. A blue filled circle depicts Ne, and a red filled square depicts the limit order book
volume. According to Pc, we classify the market into three distinct states: MEMH(Mimicking Efficient Market Hypothesis),
MRFM(Mimicking Real Financial Market), or MMC(Mimicking Market Collapse). (b)(d)(f) There are CDF(Cumulative
Distribution Function) of volatility, the bid-ask spread and the first gap in an MEMH state and the entire state. A red blank
circle represents the CDF of an entire state. The blue-black square represents the CDF of an MEMH state. A dashed black
line represents an exponential distribution function.
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